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1.	  Carbon	  Markets	  and	  the	  Post-­‐2020	  Scenario:	  the	  Importance	  of	  Transatlantic	  
Cooperation	  
	  In	   December	   2011,	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   (COP)	   to	   the	   United	  Nations	   Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  adopted	  the	  Durban	  Platform	  for	  Enhanced	  Action,	  which	   launched	   a	   round	   of	   negotiations	   aimed	   at	   concluding	   “a	   protocol,	   another	   legal	  instrument	  or	  an	  agreed	  outcome	  with	  legal	  force”	  for	  the	  post	  2020	  period,	  to	  be	  adopted	  at	  the	  Paris	  COP	  in	  2015.	  	  The	   most	   likely	   outcome	   is	   a	   hybrid	   system	   combining	   “bottom-­‐up”	   elements	   (like	   the	  “nationally	  determined	  contributions”)	  and	  “top-­‐down”	  aspects	   (with	  regard	   to	  monitoring,	  reporting	   and	   verification).	   The	   future	   climate	   regime	   is	   taking	   shape	   as	   a	   patchwork	   of	  different	  policies,	   combining	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	   (such	  as	   emissions	   trading,	   carbon	  taxes,	   emissions	   reduction	   credit	   systems)	   as	   well	   as	   traditional	   command-­‐and-­‐control	  instruments1.	  The	  picture	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  on-­‐going	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  about	  the	   Framework	   of	   Various	  Approaches	   and	   the	  New	  Market	  Mechanism	   and	   the	   uncertain	  future	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  flexible	  mechanisms2.	  With	  regard	  to	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms,	  39	  national	  and	  23	  sub-­‐national	  jurisdictions	  have	  implemented	   or	   are	   about	   to	   implement	   carbon	   pricing	   instruments.	   Only	   in	   2013,	   8	   new	  carbon	  markets	  were	  established,	  with	  China	  hosting	  the	  second	  largest	  system	  in	  the	  world.	  Emissions	   trading	   schemes	   continue	   to	   develop	   steadily,	   despite	   the	   slow	   pace	   of	  international	  negotiations3.	  Against	   this	   fragmented	   scenario,	   coordination	   appears	   crucial.	   The	   role	   of	   transatlantic	  relations	   has	   been	   highlighted	   as	   capable	   of	   playing	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   ensuring	   an	  effective	  response	  to	  the	  climate	  change	  challenge4.	  This	  is	  even	  more	  true	  regarding	  market-­‐based	   mechanisms.	   With	   regard	   to	   carbon	   markets,	   since	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   global	  carbon	   market	   appears	   implausible,	   linkage	   has	   emerged	   as	   the	   main	   avenue	   for	   a	   cost-­‐effective	   and	   environmentally	   meaningful	   system5 .	   Linkage	   is	   generally	   defined	   as	   a	  mechanism	   that	   allows	  participants	   in	   an	  emissions	   trading	   scheme	   to	  use	  emissions	  units	  issued	   under	   another	   emissions	   trading	   scheme	   to	   meet	   compliance	   obligations 6 .	   A	  
                                                      
1 See D. BODANKSY, S. HOEDL, METCALF G.E., STAVINS R.N., Facilitating Linkage of Heterogeneous Regional, 
National, and Sub-National Climate Policies Through a Future International Agreement, Discussion Paper, 
Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 
School, November 2014. 
2  D. CONWAY, Blazing Trail or Flickering Flame? Market Mechanisms under the UNFCCC, in G.VAN 
CALSTER, W. VANDENBERGHE , L. REINS, Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law, 2015. 
3 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing, World Bank Group, Washington 2014. 
4 C. BAKKER, F. FRANCIONI, Introduction, in C. BAKKER, F. FRANCIONI, The EU, the US and Global Climate 
Governance, 2014. 
5 A. MARCU, The Role of Market Mechanisms in a Post-2020 Climate Change Agreement, Center for European 
Policy Studies, 2014, S. BORGHESI, M. MONTINI, The European Emissions Trading System: Flashing Lights, 
Dark Shadows and Future Prospects for Global ETS Cooperation, in C. BAKKER, F. FRANCIONI, supra note 4, 
2014. 
6 M. MEHLING, Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes, in D. FREESTONE, C. STRECK, Legal Aspects of Carbon 
Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond, 2009, p. 108. 
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transatlantic	   linkage	   «could	   represent	   the	   most	   relevant	   example	   of	   interacting	   blocks,	  linking	   the	   EU,	   as	   the	   largest	   existing	   ETS	   system,	   with	   the	   US,	   which	   has	   the	   broadest	  longstanding	   expertise	   in	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade» 7 .	   The	   birth	   and	   evolution	   of	   market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  itself	  shows	  the	  relevance	  of	  EU-­‐US	  relations:	  these	  instruments,	  born	  in	  the	  US,	  became	  the	  core	  of	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  regime	  through	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  a	  cornerstone	   of	   EU	   climate	   policies.	   While	   the	   US	   has	   distanced	   itself	   from	   the	   Kyoto	  agreement	   and	   has	   never	   adopted	   a	   federal	   legislation	   on	   climate	   change,	   sub-­‐national	  entities	   have	   reacted	   to	   federal	   inaction	   through	   different	   initiatives,	   many	   of	   which	   are	  based	  on	  market	  mechanisms.	  The	  recent	  Clean	  Power	  Plan,	  a	  proposal	  by	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  to	  cut	  carbon	  emissions	  from	  existing	  power	  plants,	  may	  constitute	  an	  incentive	  for	  further	  developments	  of	  sub-­‐federal	  carbon	  markets8.	  	  	  
2.	  Market-­‐Based	  Mechanisms	  in	  Environmental	  Law	  
	  
2.1.	  Definition,	  Economic	  Rationale	  and	  Theoretical	  Foundations	  
	  Two	   aspects	   can	   be	   distinguished	   in	   environmental	   discipline:	   the	   purpose	   (for	   example,	  avoiding	   adverse	   effects	   on	   health)	   and	   the	   instruments	   adopted	   to	   achieve	   the	   purpose9.	  Environmental	   instruments	  are	  generally	  grouped	   in	   two	  categories:	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  and	  market-­‐based.	  Under	  a	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulation,	  uniform	  standards	  are	  applied	  to	   all	   relevant	   operators.	   Examples	   can	   be	   a	   quantitative	   limit	   on	   emissions	   of	   a	   given	  polluting	   substance,	   or	   the	   mandatory	   adoption	   of	   a	   certain	   technology10.	   This	   kind	   of	  discipline	   has	   been	   criticized	   because,	   within	   a	   category	   of	   entities	   subject	   to	   the	   same	  regulation,	  single	  operators	  can	  face	  very	  different	  costs	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  same	  standard11.	  These	  inefficiencies	  are	  overcome	  by	  market-­‐based	  instruments:	  «Market-­‐based	  instruments	  are	  regulations	  that	  encourage	  behaviour	  through	  market	  signals	  rather	  than	  through	  explicit	  directives	   regarding	  pollution	   control	   levels	  or	  methods.	  These	  policy	   instruments,	   such	  as	  tradable	   permits	   or	   pollution	   charges,	   are	   often	   described	   as	   “harnessing	   market	   forces”	  because	   if	   they	   are	   well	   designed	   and	   implemented,	   they	   encourage	   firms	   (and/or	  individuals)	   to	   undertake	   pollution	   control	   efforts	   that	   are	   in	   their	   own	   interests	   and	   that	  collectively	  meet	  policy	  goals»12.	  These	  instruments	  put	  a	  “price”	  on	  pollution:	  each	  operator	  will	   be	   able	   to	   decide	  whether	   to	   reduce	   their	   pollution	   level	   or	   to	   pay	   the	   corresponding	  price13.	  These	  instruments	  «allow	  any	  desired	  level	  of	  pollution	  clean-­‐up	  to	  be	  realized	  at	  the	  
                                                      
7 S. BORGHESI, M. MONTINI, The European Emissions Trading System, supra note 5. 
8  Clean Power Plant Proposed Rule, EPA website, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-
power-plan-proposed-rule. 
9 R.N. STAVINS, Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments, in K.G. MÄLER , J. VINCENT, 
Handbook of Environmental Economics, Amsterdam, 2003, p. 358. 
10 D.M. DRIESEN, R.W. ADLER, K.H. ENGEL, Environmental Law: a Conceptual and Pragmatic Approach, 
2011, pp. 267-295. 
11 H.LATIN, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning 
Regulatory Reforms, in Stanford Law Review, 1985, vol. 37, pp. 1267-1269. 
12 R.N. STAVINS, Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments, supra note 9, p. 358. 
13 C. FISCHER, Technical Innovation and Design Choices for Emissions Trading and Other Climate Policies, in 
B. HANSÜRGENS, Emissions Trading for Climate Policy. US and European Perspectives, Cambridge, 2005, p. 
40. 
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lowest	  overall	  cost	  to	  society,	  by	  providing	  incentives	  for	  the	  greatest	  reductions	  in	  pollution	  by	  those	  firms	  that	  an	  achieve	  these	  reductions	  most	  cheaply»14.	  	  Market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  divided	   into	   taxes	  and	  emissions	   trading,	  which	   includes	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   and	   offset	   mechanisms15.	   In	   a	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   system,	   a	   cap	   on	   emissions	   is	  established	   and	   the	   total	   amount	   is	   divided	   into	   allowances,	   which	   are	   allocated	   to	   the	  regulated	   entities16.	   In	   an	   offset	   system,	   emissions	   reductions	   generate	   credits	   that	   can	   be	  used	  to	  offset	  other	  emissions17.	  The	  theoretical	  foundation	  of	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  is	  generally	  identified	  in	  the	  Coase	  theorem,	   which	   framed	   the	   discussion	   on	   pollution	   control	   in	   terms	   of	   private	   rights18.	  According	  to	  this	  theorem,	  by	  identifying	  these	  rights	  and	  making	  them	  transferable,	  private	  negotiation	  will	   achieve	   the	   optimal	   allocation	   of	   resources19.	   Dales	   and	   other	   economists	  further	   developed	   this	   idea,	   creating	   the	   «academic	   and	   experimental	   platform	   that	  made	  emissions	  trading	  in	  practice	  possible»20.	  	  	  
2.2.	  Emissions	  Trading	  in	  Practice	  	  In	  the	  50	  years	  following	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Coase	  theorem,	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  gradually	   attained	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   debate	   on	   environmental	   regulation21.	   The	   United	  States	  were	  the	   first	   to	  put	  the	  emissions	  trading	  theory	   into	  practice,	  and	  their	  pioneering	  effort	  proved	  later	  crucial	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  Kyoto’s	  flexibility	  mechanisms22.	  	  The	  first	  experiments	  were	  the	  EPA	  Emissions	  Trading	  (1977)	  and	  the	  Lead	  Trading	  Program	  (1985).	  However,	  it	  was	  the	  success	  of	  the	  1990	  Acid	  Rain	  Program	  to	  advance	  the	  popularity	  of	   emissions	   trading	   systems23.	   The	  Program	   satisfied	  or	   exceeded	   expectations	   at	   a	   lower	  cost	   than	  what	  estimated	   for	  a	  command-­‐and-­‐control	   system24.	  Among	   the	  reasons	   for	   this	  success,	  one	  can	  highlight,	   first,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  cumbersome	  bureaucratic	  procedures	  that	  were	   in	   place	   for	   the	   EPA	   Emissions	   Trading	   System	  were	   avoided;	   second,	   an	   extremely	  stringent	   and	   accurate	   monitoring	   system	  was	   employed25.	   The	   first	   case	   where	   different	  States	  agreed	  to	  create	  a	  regional	  system	  was	  the	  OTX	  NOx	  Budget	  Program	  (OCTNBP)26.	  
                                                      
14 R.N. STAVINS, Experience with Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments, supra note 9, pp. 358-359. 
15 According to the classification adopted by D.M. DRIESEN, R.W. ADLER, K.H. ENGEL, supra note 10, 2011, pp. 
297-322 
16 C. WOLD, D. HUNTER, M. POWERS, Climate Change and the Law, 2009, p. 57. 
17 Ibidem. 
18 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, Emissions Trading Schemes: Markets, States and Law, 2013, pp. 45-46. 
19 R.H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1-44. See also 
T. H. TIETENBERG, Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice, 2006. 
20 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, Emissions Trading Schemes, supra note 18, p. 359, A.D. ELLERMAN, F.J. CONVERY, C. DE 
PERTHUIS, Pricing Carbon: the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, Cambridge, 2010, p. 9. 
21 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, Emissions Trading Schemes, supra note 18, p. 46. 
22 Ivi, p. 47. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 A.D. ELLERMAN, P.L. JOSKOW, D. HARRISON, Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons and 
Considerations for Greenhouse Gases, prepared for the PEW Center on Global Climate Change, 2003, pp. 12-
17. 
25 Ivi, p. 16; V. JACOMETTI, Lo scambio di quote di emissione. Analisi di un nuovo strumento di tutela 
ambientale in prospettiva comparatistica, Milano, 2010, pp. 71-72, 98-99. 
26 T. H. TIETENBERG, supra note 19, p. 13. 
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3.	  Market-­‐Based	  Mechanisms	  against	  Climate	  Change:	  the	  Kyoto	  Experience	  
	  The	  flexible	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  are	  the	  first	  example	  of	  the	  market-­‐based	  logic	  applied	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   climate	   change.	   The	   US	   influenced	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	  arrangement	   in	  many	  ways.	   As	   shown	   above,	   its	   pioneering	   efforts	   and	   the	   success	   of	   the	  Acid	   Rain	   Program	   advanced	   the	   popularity	   of	   pollution	   pricing	   systems.	   Furthermore,	  during	   the	   negotiations	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   the	   US	   insisted	   on	   the	   inclusion	   of	   flexible	  mechanisms,	  putting	  economic	  efficiency	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  climate	  regime27.	  Moreover,	  many	  studies	  have	  investigated	  the	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  US	  experience	  and	  how	  they	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  market-­‐based	  climate	  strategies28.	  	  The	   Kyoto	   flexible	   mechanisms	   are	   the	   Joint	   Implementation,	   the	   Clean	   Development	  
Mechanism	  and	   the	   International	   Emissions	   Trading.	   Under	   the	   Joint	   Implementation	   (JI),	   a	  Kyoto	   Annex	   I	   country	   can	   carry	   out	   an	   emissions	   reduction	   project	   in	   another	   Annex	   I	  country.	   The	   project	   generates	   Emission	   Reduction	   Units	   (ERUs)	   that	   can	   be	   used	   by	   the	  country	  that	  implemented	  the	  project	  to	  comply	  with	  its	  emissions	  reduction	  obligations.	  The	  
Clean	   Development	   Mechanism	   allows	   an	   Annex	   I	   country	   to	   implement	   an	   emissions	  reduction	  project	  in	  a	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  country.	  The	  former	  will	  be	  able	  to	  use	  the	  credits	  gained	  from	   the	   emissions	   reduction	   (Certified	   Emissions	   Reduction	   or	   CERs)	   for	   compliance	  purposes.	  Under	  the	  International	  Emissions	  Trading	  (IET),	  an	  Annex	  I	  country	  can	  purchase	  emissions	  allowances	  and	  emissions	  reduction	  credits	  from	  another	  Annex	  I	  country29.	  	  The	   functioning	   of	   these	   mechanisms	   has	   been	   marked	   by	   controversy,	   their	   ability	   to	  guarantee	  environmental	  integrity	  and	  to	  create	  actual	  incentives	  for	  pollution	  reduction	  has	  been	  questioned.	  Under	  the	  UNFCCC,	  with	  the	  negotiations	  on	  the	  New	  Market	  Mechanisms,	  the	  attention	  is	  now	  shifting	  towards	  designing	  mechanisms	  that	  involve	  whole	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	   While	   the	   future	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   mechanisms	   is	   uncertain,	   they	   undoubtedly	  constitute	   an	   important	   source	   of	   experience	   that	   will	   certainly	   be	   precious	   for	   future	  developments	  of	  market-­‐based	  instruments30.	  
                                                      
27 Cfr. C.P. CARLARNE, Climate Change Law and Policy. EU and US Approaches, Oxford 2010, pp. 276-277, V. 
JACOMETTI, supra note 25, pp. 145-146. 
28  See, for example: R. N. STAVINS, Implications of the US experience with market- based environment 
strategies for future climate policies, A. D. ELLERMAN, US experience with emissions trading: lessons for CO2 
emissions trading, in B. HANSU RGENS, supra note 13, A. D. ELLERMAN, P. L. JOSKOW, D. HARRISON, 
Emissions Trading in the US, supra note 24, M. W. GEHRING, C. STRECK, Emissions Trading: Lessons from SOx 
and NOx Emissions Allowance and Credit Systems Legal Nature, Title, Transfer and Taxation of Emission 
Allowances and Credits, in Environmental Law Reporter, 2005, vol. 35. 
29 For an overview of flexible mechanisms, see e.g. P. SANDS, J. PEEL, A.FABRA. R. MACKENZIE, Principles of 
International Environmental Law, Cambridge, 2012, P. BIRNIE, A. BOY, C. REDGWELL, International Law and 
the Environment, Oxford, 2009, F. YAMIN, J. DEPLEDGE, The International Climate Change Regime. A Guide to 
Rules, Institutions and Procedures, Cambridge, 2004, R.G. NEWELL, W.A. PIZER, D. RAIMI, Carbon Markets 15 
Years After Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New Challenges, in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013, 
M.MONTINI, Il Protocollo di Kyoto e il Clean Development Mechanism: aspetti giuridici e istituzionali, Milano, 
2008, V. JACOMETTI, supra note 25, 2010. 




THE	  EUROPEAN	  UNION	  EMISSIONS	  TRADING	  SYSTEM	  	  
1.	  The	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  	  The	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	   System	   (EU	  ETS)	  was	   established	  by	   the	  Directive	  2003/87/CE31	  and	  became	  operational	  in	  2005.	  The	  EU	  ETS	  is	  a	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system	  and	  it	  is	   considered	   a	   “cornerstone”	   of	   European	   climate	   policies.	   It	   is	   the	   first	   and	   largest	  international	   emissions	   trading	   system,	   operating	   in	   the	   28	   Member	   States,	   Iceland,	  Liechtenstein	   and	  Norway,	   and	   covering	  more	   than	  11.000	   installations32.	   The	   system	  was	  established	  “to	  contribute	  to	  fulfilling	  the	  commitments	  of	  the	  European	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	   States	   more	   effectively,	   through	   an	   efficient	   European	   market	   in	   greenhouse	   gas	  emission	   allowances,	   with	   the	   least	   possible	   diminution	   of	   economic	   development	   and	  employment”33.	   The	   European	   Union	   originally	   opposed	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	   during	  the	   negotiations	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   and	   has	   changed	   its	   position	   from	   “laggard”	   to	  “leader”	  in	  emissions	  trading	  in	  only	  a	  few	  years34.	  The	   EU	  ETS	   has	   until	   now	   gone	   through	   three	   phases	   of	   operation:	   Phase	   I,	   from	  2005	   to	  2007;	  Phase	  II,	  from	  2008	  to	  2012;	  Phase	  III,	  from	  2013	  to	  2020.	  The	  first	  two	  phases	  were	  governed	  by	  Directive	  	  2003/87/CE;	  an	  important	  revision	  for	  Phase	  III	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  Directive	  2009/29/CE35.	  An	  examination	  of	  the	  most	  relevant	  changes	  is	  warranted.	  	  
1.1.	  Cap-­‐Setting	  	  In	  the	  first	  two	  phases,	  the	  cap	  was	  not	  established	  at	  the	  European	  level.	  Every	  State	  decided	  on	  how	  many	  allowances	  to	  allocate	  and	  on	  their	  distribution	  to	  the	  relevant	  operators.	  This	  was	  done	   through	  National	  Allocation	  Plans,	  which	  were	   reviewed	  by	   the	  Commission	  and	  could	  be	  rejected	  for	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  EU	  ETS	  Directive	  or	  EU	  rules	  on	  competition	  and	  state	  aid	  law36.	  This	  system,	  however,	  gave	  rise	  to	  several	  dysfunctions.	  
                                                      
31 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC, Official Journal L 275, 25/10/2003, P. 0032 – 0046. 
32  The EU Emissions Trading System, European Commission website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
33 Directive 2003/87/CE, Preamble, par. 5. 
34 See J. B. SKJÆRSETH, J. WETTESTAD, The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emissions 
Trading System, in Global Environmental Politics, 2009, vol. 9, p. 102. 
35 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community, Official Journal L 140, 5.6.2009, P. 63–87. 
36  EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). National Allocation Plans. European Commission website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm, S. BOGOJEVIĆ, The EU ETS Directive Revised: 
Yet Another Stepping Stone, in Environmental Law Review, 2009, vol. 11, p. 283. 
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First,	  during	   the	   first	  Phase	   the	  NAPs	  were	  characterized	  by	   low	  ambition	  and	  were	   in	  many	  cases	  based	  on	   inflated	  projections37.	  This	   generated	  an	  over-­‐allocation	  of	   allowances	  with	   a	  consequent	   price	   collapse38.	   For	   Phase	   II,	   the	   Commission	   imposed	   more	   stringent	   limits	  thanks	   to	   the	   use	   of	   objective	   projections	   based	   on	   2005	   verified	   emissions39.	   This	  was	   not	  enough,	   however,	   to	   avoid	   the	   over-­‐allocation	   problem,	   due	   to	   the	   economic	   crisis	   and	   the	  consequent	   decrease	   in	   emissions	   and	   allowances	   demand40.	   Other	   criticisms	   concerned	   the	  complexity	   and	   low	   transparency	   of	   the	   Plans41,	   the	   risk	   that	   differences	   among	  Plans	   could	  distort	  competition42,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  centralized	  system	  could	  be	  more	  stable	  and	  reliable43.	  For	  Phase	  III,	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  have	  a	  centralized	  cap	  set	  by	  the	  European	  Commission.	  	  
1.2.	  Allocation	  Method	  
	  During	   the	   first	   two	  Phases,	   allowances	  were	   almost	   exclusively	   allocated	   for	   free	   through	  grandfathering	   (i.e.,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   historic	   emission	   levels)44.	   This	   allocation	  method	  was	  criticized	   under	   many	   aspects.	   The	   compatibility	   of	   this	   system	   with	   the	   “polluter	   pays	  principle”	  has	  been	  questioned45.	  Another	  controversial	  issue	  concerned	  “windfall	  profits”,	  a	  phenomenon	  concerning	  mainly	  the	  electricity-­‐producing	  sector,	  which	  is	  able	  to	  “integrate	  the	  value	  of	  used	  emission	  allowances	  which	  were	  allocated	  free	  of	  charge	  into	  the	  price	  of	  electricity”46.	  In	  Phase	  III,	  the	  default	  allocation	  method	  has	  become	  auctioning.	  Businesses	  will	  have	  to	  buy	  an	   increasing	   proportion	   of	   allowances	   through	   auctions,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   eliminating	   free	  allocation	   by	   2027	   except	   for	   sectors	   exposed	   to	   leakage	   (e.g.,	   relocation	   of	   the	   activity	   in	  third	  countries)47.	  	  	  
1.3.	  Verification	  and	  Monitoring	  
	  In	   Phases	   I	   and	   II,	   the	   Member	   States	   were	   responsible	   for	   verification	   and	   monitoring	  procedures48.	   The	   European	   Commission	   had	   tried	   to	   attain	   uniform	   controls	   across	   the	  
                                                      
37 C. EGENHOFER, The Making of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Status, Prospects and Implications for 
Business, in European Management Journal, 2007, vol. 25, p. 456, V. JACOMETTI, supra note 25, p. 264. 
38 K. CAPOOR, P. AMBROSI, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007, World Bank, pp. 12-13. 
39 C. EGENHOFER, The Making of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, supra note 37, p. 458. 
40 A. VLACHOU, The European Union’s Emissions Trading System, in Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2013, p. 8. 
41 A. VLACHOU, The European Union’s Emissions Trading System, supra note 40, pp. 4-5, C. EGENHOFER, The 
Making of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, supra note 37, pp. 455-456. 
42 A.D. ELLERMAN, F.J. CONVERY, C. DE PERTHIUS, Pricing Carbon, supra note 20, p. 34. 
43 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, The EU ETS Revised, supra note 36, pp. 281-282. 
44 EU ETS 2005-2012, European Commission website, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm 
45 J. NASH, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” 
Principle, in Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2000, vol. 24, p. 505.  
46 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 21 March 2013, Iberdrola, SA and Others v Administración 
del Estado, joined Cases C-566/11, C-567/11, C-580/11, C-591/11, C-620/11 and C-640/11, para. 2. 
47  The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), European Commission website 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm, V. JACOMETTI, supra note 25. 
48 Council Directive (EC) 2003/87, above n. 1, Articles 14-15. 
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Member	  States	  adopting	  Guidelines49.	   In	   spite	  of	   this,	  notable	  differences	  between	  Member	  States	   for	  monitoring	  and	  verification	  procedures	  remained,	  contributing	   to	   the	  complexity	  and	  instability	  of	  the	  system50.	  The	  EU	  has	  thus	  opted	  for	  centralization	  of	  this	  aspect	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  regulations.	  Moreover,	  for	  Phase	  III	  the	  Registries	  system	  has	  been	  revised.	  Registries	  are	  “standardised	  electronic	  databases	  ensuring	  the	  accurate	  accounting	  of	  the	  issuance,	  holding,	  transfer	  and	  cancellation	  of	   emission	  allowances”51.	  Before	   the	   reform,	   every	  State	  had	   its	  own	  national	  registry	  and	  the	  registries	  were	  linked	  through	  the	  Community	  Independent	  Transaction	  Log	  (CITL).	  The	  2009	  revision	  has	  centralized	  the	  system,	  and	  the	  national	  registries	  have	  been	  substituted	  by	  a	  single	  European	  Registry52.	  	  	  
2.	  Centralization,	  Decentralization	  and	  the	  Subsidiarity	  Principle	  
	  The	  EU	  ETS	  system	  was	  originally	  very	  decentralized	  and	  key	  decisions	  were	  left	  to	  Member	  States 53 .	   In	   Phase	   III,	   as	   explained	   above,	   many	   aspects	   have	   been	   centralized.	   The	  compatibility	  of	  these	  changes	  with	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle	  has	  been	  debated.	  	  According	  to	  Lenaerts,	  an	  emissions	  trading	  scheme	  is	  itself	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle.	  This	  position	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  in	  such	  a	  system	  	  the	  role	  of	  the	  government	  is	  marginal,	  as	  it	  is	  limited	  to	  setting	  a	  cap	  and	  a	  permit	  system	  and	  monitoring	  emissions54.	  Some	  authors	  have	  seen	  the	  centralization	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  revision	  as	  a	  “Commission	  
coup”55	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  radical	  harmonization56.	  De	  Cendra	  De	  Larragán	  advanced	  several	  doubts	  on	  the	  conformity	  of	  the	  amendments	  with	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle.	  The	  author	  has	  argued	   that	   the	   cap	   centralization	  was	  not	   justified	  by	   the	  problems	  of	  Phase	   I,	  which	  was	  conceived	  as	  an	  experimental	  phase57.	  Other	   authors	   have	   given	   a	  more	   nuanced	   interpretation	   of	   the	   2009	   reform,	   highlighting	  that	   it	   included	   aspects	   of	   decentralization	   as	   well,	   for	   example	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  management	  of	   auctions.	  According	   to	   this	   view,	   the	   reform	  determined	   a	  balanced	  power	  allocation	  between	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Member	  States58.	  	  	  
                                                      
49 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, The EU ETS Revised, supra note 36, p. 282. 
50 Ibidem, V. JACOMETTI, supra note 25, p. 266. 
51  Q&A on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-
796_en.htm. 
52 See Union Registry, European Commission website, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/registry/index_en.htm 
53 J.KRUGER, W.E.OATES, W.A. PIZER, Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for 
Global Policy, in Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2007, vol. 1, pp. 112-133. 
54 K. LENAERTS, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the 
Balance of Federalism, in Fordham International Law Journal, 1993, vol. 17, pp. 892-893. 
55 J. WETTESTAD, Revising EU Emissions Trading: A “Requested Revolution”?, The European Union and the 
Fight against Global Climate Change Lecture Series, 2008. 
56 DE CENDRA DE LARRAGÁN, Too Much Harmonization? An Analysis of the Commission’s Proposal to Amend 
the EU ETS from the Perspective of Legal Principles, in M. FAURE, M. PEETERS, Climate Change and European 
Emissions Trading: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 2008, pp. 53-84. 
57 Ibidem. 
58 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, The EU ETS Revised, supra note 36, p. 76.  
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3.	  EU	  ETS	  Case-­‐Law	  	  
	  The	  EU	  ETS	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  over	  40	  judicial	  proceedings	  before	  European	  judges	  only	  in	  its	  first	  4	  years	  of	  operation,	  and	   is	   the	  most	   frequently	   litigated	  environmental	   instrument	   in	  EU	  law59.	  The	  case-­‐law	  includes	  challenges	  to	  Commission’s	  Decisions	  on	  the	  NAPs	  under	  art.	  263	   TFEU,	   requests	   for	   preliminary	   rulings	   under	   art.	   267	   TFEU	   and	   infringement	  procedures	  under	  art.	  258.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  part	  is	  to	  highlight	  some	  fundamental	  issues	  arisen	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  judgments.	  The	   case	   law	   shows	   first	   of	   all	   that	   at	   the	   core	   of	   EU	   ETS	   litigation	   lies	   the	   question	   of	  competence	  allocation:	   it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  European	  courts	   frame	  EU	  ETS	  questions	   in	  constitutional	   terms60.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   cases	   Estonia	   v.	   Commission61	  and	   Poland	   v.	  
Commission62 ,	   the	   Member	   States	   challenged	   the	   Commission’s	   decision	   to	   reject	   their	  National	  Allocation	  Plans,	  by	  which	  Member	  States	  decided	  on	  allowance	  allocation	  in	  Phases	  I	  and	  II.	  While	  the	  Commission	  argued	  for	  a	  teleological	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Directive	  which	  would	   take	   into	  account	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  measures	  on	  the	   functioning	  of	   the	  market,	  both	  the	  General	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  strictly	  focused	  on	  whether	  regulatory	  competence	  was	  allocated	  in	  accordance	  with	  EU	  law,	  refusing	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  possible	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  market63.	  	  Another	  point	  concerns	  the	  link	  between	  the	  decisions	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  European	  carbon	   market.	   For	   example,	   the	   market	   reacted	   immediately	   to	   the	   judgments	   on	   the	  Estonian	  and	  Polish	  NAPs.	  Van	  Zeben	  has	  argued	  in	  this	  respect	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  draw	  a	  line	  between	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  and	  the	  carbon	  market64.	  More	  generally,	  Van	  Zeben	  and	  Dari-­‐Mattiacci	   have	   highlighted	   the	   link	   between	   regulatory	   and	   market	   uncertainty,	   a	  connection	  that	  appears	  particularly	  strong	  for	  “artificial	  markets”	  like	  the	  EU	  ETS65.	  A	  further	  issue	  concerns	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  case-­‐law	  and	  the	  2009	  revision.	  Many	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  centralization	  of	  the	  cap	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  large	  number	  of	  controversies	  that	  NAPs	  have	  generated.	  This	  change	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  litigation	  and	  the	  consequent	  market	   instability66.	  Other	  scholars,	  however,	  have	  underlined	  that	  a	  vast	  array	  
                                                      
59 N.S. GHALEIGH, Two Stories About EU Climate Change Law and Policy, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 
14, 2013, p. 70 et seq., N.S.GHALEIGH, Emissions Trading Before the European Court of Justice: Market 
Making in Luxembourg, in D. FREESTONE, C. STRECK, supra note 6, p. 374. 
60 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, EU Climate change litigation: All Quiet on the Luxembourgian Front?, in G. VAN CALSTER, 
W. VANDENBERGHE, L. REINS, Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law, 2015. 
61  Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Seventh Chamber) of 23 September 2009, Republic of Estonia v 
Commission of the European Communities, case T-263/07; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 29 
March 2012, European Commission v Republic of Estonia, Case C-505/09 P. 
62 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) of 23 September 2009, Republic of Poland v 
Commission of the European Communities, Case T-183/07; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 29 
March 2012 European Commission v Republic of Poland, Case C-504/09 P. 
63 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, Emissions Trading Schemes, supra note 18, pp. 304-313, J. VAN ZEBEN, Case Note. Respective 
Powers of the European Member States and Commission Regarding Emissions Trading and Allowance 
Allocation, in Environmental Law Review, 2010, vol. 12, p. 222. 
64 J. VAN ZEBEN, Case Note, supra note 63, pp. 222-224. 
65 G. DARI-MATTIACCI, J. VAN ZEBEN, Legal and Market Uncertainty in Market-Based Instruments: The Case 
of the EU ETS, in N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal, 2012, vol. 19, pp. 415-453. 
66 N. VAN AKEN, M PAQUES, The ‘Emissions Trading Scheme’ case-law: some new paths for a better European 
environmental protection?, in M. FAURE, M. PEETERS, supra note 56, p. 116, S. BOGOJEVIĆ Emissions Trading 
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of	  issues	  which	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  litigation	  remains:	  the	  allocation	  to	  sectors	  exposed	  to	  risk	  of	  leakage;	   transitional	   free	   allocations	   for	   modernization	   of	   electricity	   generation;	   national	  implementation	  measures67.	  Another	  problematic	  aspect	  concerns	  access	   to	   justice.	  Until	  now,	  all	  actions	   for	  annulment	  presented	  by	  private	  operators	  have	  been	  dismissed	   for	   failure	   to	   comply	  with	  art.	   263(4)	  standing	   requirements.	   The	   preliminary	   reference	   procedure	   is	   therefore	   the	   only	  way	   for	  private	  operators	  to	  access	  European	  courts.	  Views	  on	  future	  developments	  of	  this	  limitation	  of	  access	  to	  justice	  differ:	  De	  Cendra	  De	  Larragán68	  has	  suggested	  that	  EU	  courts	  might	  alter	  this	  pattern,	  and	  compensate	  at	  least	  in	  part	  for	  the	  limited	  participation	  of	  private	  parties	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process;	  Bogojević	  69	  interprets	   this	   attitude	   as	   an	   example	  of	   “judicial	  subsidiarity”,	  that	  is,	  the	  objective	  of	  reducing	  interventions	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  	  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Schemes, supra note 18, pp. 327-328 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, The EU ETS Directive Revised, supra note 36, pp. 281-283, 
N. S. GHALEIGH, Emissions Trading, supra note 59, pp. 377-378. 
67 G. DARI-MATTIACCI, J. VAN ZEBEN, supra note 65, p. 448. 
68 DE CENDRA DE LARRAGÁN, Distributional Choices in EU Climate Change Law and Policy, 2010. 
69 S. BOGOJEVIĆ, EU Climate change litigation: All Quiet on the Luxembourgian Front?, supra note 60. 
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SECTION	  3	  
CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  AND	  MARKET	  MECHANISMS	  IN	  THE	  US	  
	  
1.	  Federal	  Policy	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
	  The	   US	   has	   no	   comprehensive	   federal	   legislation	   on	   climate	   change 70 .	   The	   Obama	  Administration	  has	  recently	  adopted	  measures	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  inaction	  of	  the	  Congress,	  the	   most	   relevant	   of	   which	   is	   the	   Clean	   Power	   Plan,	   proposed	   by	   the	   Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  in	  June	  2014.	  At	   the	   international	   level,	   the	   US	   is	   a	   party	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   but	   not	   to	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	  despite	  having	   actively	   taken	  part	   in	   its	   negotiations71.	  During	   the	  negotiations,	   the	   Senate	  adopted	  the	  Byrd-­‐Hagel	  resolution,	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  US	  would	  not	  ratify	  a	  Treaty	  that	  did	  not	  impose	  emissions	  reduction	  obligations	  also	  upon	  developing	  countries72.	   In	  September	  1998,	   President	   Clinton	   nevertheless	   signed	   the	   Protocol.	   In	   March	   2001,	   President	   Bush	  expressed	   his	   opposition	   to	   the	   treaty	   in	   a	   famous	   letter,	   and	   14	   days	   later	   the	   EPA	  announced	  that	  the	  US	  would	  repudiate	  the	  Protocol73.	  The	  reaction	  to	  the	  federal	  void	  on	  climate	  change	  came	  from	  sub-­‐national	  entities:	  the	  US	  is	  a	  patchwork	  of	  regional,	  state	  and	   local	   initiatives	  to	  combat	  climate	  change.	  Many	  of	   them	  are	  based	  on	  market-­‐based	  systems:	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  possibilities	  of	  transatlantic	  cooperation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  carbon	  markets,	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  schemes	  and	  of	  the	  legal	  issues	  involved	  is	  warranted.	  	  
2.	  Sub-­‐Federal	  Market-­‐Based	  Initiatives:	  RGGI,	  WCI	  and	  the	  Californian	  System	  	  The	   first	  market-­‐based	  program	  on	  carbon	  emissions	   in	   the	  US	   is	   the	  Regional	  Greenhouse	  Gas	   Initiative,	   based	   on	   a	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   system74.	   It	   includes	   9	   States	   and	   provides	   for	   a	  multi-­‐state	   cap	   on	   CO2	   emissions	   from	   power	   plants,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   attaining	   a	   10%	  emissions	   reduction	   by	   201875.	   Allowances	   are	   allocated	  mainly	   through	   auctioning:	   it	   has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  market	  dysfunctions	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  caused	  by	  grandfathering	  made	  auctioning	   politically	   viable76.	   RGGI	   has	   been	   criticized	   under	   many	   aspects.	   It	   has	   been	  argued	   that	   its	   emission	   reduction	   objectives	   were	   too	   modest,	   and,	   like	   the	   EU	   ETS,	   the	  program	  was	  plagued	  by	  over-­‐allocation77.	  Some	  States	  generated	  controversy	  by	  using	  the	  
                                                      
70 R. HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, Climate Change and the States: Constitutional Issues Arising from State Climate 
Protection Leadership, in Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 2008, vol. 8, pp. 7-8. 
71 C.P. CARLARNE, Climate Change Law and Policy, supra note 27, p. 15, pp. 35-36, M. LISOWSKI, Playing the 
Two-Level Game: US President Bush’s Decision to Repudiate the Kyoto Protocol, in Environmental Politics, 
2002, vol.11, p. 101. 
72 Sense of the Senate Resolution n. 98 (105th), see C. WOLD, D. HUNTER, M. POWERS, supra note 16, p. 478. 
73 M. LISOWSKI, supra note 71, p. 101. 
74 P. HIBBARD, S. TIERNEY, A. OKIE, P. DARLING, The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative on Ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States, 2011, Analysis Group. 
75 Multi-State Climate Initiatives. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. 
76 B.G. RABE, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition: Selecting Climate Policy Tools in the United States, in 
Governance: an International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 2010, vol. 23, pp. 597-598. 
77 K.LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions Trading in the US: Legal Issues, in D. FREESTONE, C. 
STRECK, supra note 6, pp. 392-393. 
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revenues	   from	   auctions	   to	   ease	   budget	   deficits,	   and	   in	   2011	   New	   Jersey	   abandoned	   the	  program78.	  RGGI	  has	  at	  the	  same	  time	  received	  positive	  evaluations,	  an	  example	  of	  which	  is	  the	   2011	   study	   by	   Analysis	   Group,	   which	   concluded	   that	   RGGI	   brought	   about	   economic	  benefits	   to	   the	   participating	   States	   and	   to	   consumers79.	   What	   is	   undisputable	   is	   that	   this	  experiment	   constitutes	   a	   precious	   source	   of	   information	   on	   the	   functioning	   of	   multi-­‐State	  emissions	  trading	  systems80.	  The	  Western	  Climate	  Initiative	  (WCI)	  is	  “a	  collaboration	  of	  jurisdictions	  working	  together	  to	  identify,	   evaluate,	   and	   implement	   emission-­‐trading	   programs	   to	   mitigate	   the	   impacts	   of	  climate	   change	   at	   a	   sub-­‐national	   level”81.	   Its	   current	   participants	   are	   British	   Columbia,	  California	  and	  Quebec.	  WCI	  lost	  most	  of	  its	  participants	  in	  2011:	  had	  the	  program	  maintained	  all	  its	  members,	  the	  initiative	  would	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  largest	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system	  in	  the	  world82.	  In	  2008,	  the	  WCI	  released	  the	  Design	  Recommendations	  for	  a	  Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	  Program	  to	   offer	   States	   a	   model	   for	   the	   development	   of	   their	   programs 83 .	   Based	   on	   the	  recommendations,	   the	   WCI	   Partners	   released	   the	   Design	   for	   the	  WCI	   Regional	   Program,	   a	  comprehensive	   strategy	   designed	   to	   reduce	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions,	   stimulate	  development	   of	   clean-­‐energy	   technologies,	   and	   create	   green	   jobs84.	   The	   WCI	   is	   in	   some	  aspects	  different	  from	  RGGI.	  Unlike	  RGGI,	   it	  covers	  multiple	  sectors.	  This	  makes	  monitoring	  more	  difficult	   for	   the	  WCI,	  as	  RGGI	  can	  count	  on	  very	  accurate	  monitoring	  systems	  (CEMS)	  which	  are	  not	  available	  for	  many	  of	  the	  sectors	  covered	  by	  the	  WCI85.	  Moreover,	  while	  RGGI	  only	  involves	  US	  States,	  the	  WCI	  includes	  US	  and	  Canadian	  entities86.	  The	   Californian	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   system	   became	   operational	   in	   January	   2013.	   Based	   on	   the	  amount	  of	   emissions	   covered,	   it	   is	   second	   in	   size	  only	   to	   the	  EU	  ETS87.	  The	  purpose	  of	   the	  program	   is	   to	   reduce	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   of	   16%	   between	   2013	   and	   202088.	   This	  program	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  normative	  framework	  that	  sees	  California	  as	  a	  pioneer	  State	  on	  climate	   change	   policies89.	  With	   regard	   to	   its	   features,	   the	   program	   covers	   electric	   utilities,	  large	   industrial	   facilities	  and,	   from	  2015	  on,	  distributors	  of	   transportation,	  natural	   gas	  and	  other	   fuels.	   This	   wide	   scope	   makes	   it	   the	   first	   multi-­‐sector	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   program	   in	   the	  United	  States90.	  The	  allocation	  method	  is	  partly	  auctioning	  and	  partly	  free	  allocation,	  and	  the	  
                                                      
78 B. HUBER, How Did RGGI Do It?, in Ecology Law Quarterly, 2013, vol. 40, p.65. 
79 HIBBARD, S. TIERNEY, A. OKIE, P. DARLING, supra note 74. 
80  J.L.RAMSEUR, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Lessons Learned and Issues for Policymakers, 
Congressional Research Service, p. 16. 
81 Multi-State Climate Initiatives. Western Climate Initiative, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.  
82 B.V. RICE, The Triumph of the Commons: An Analysis of Enforcement Problems and Solutions in the Western 
Climate Initiative, in Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal, 2009-2010, vol. 22, pp. 
402-403. 
83 D. WARREN, S. TOMASHEFSKY, The Western Climate Initiative, in State and Local Government Review, 2009, 
p. 56. 
84 Western Climate Initiative website; Multi-State Climate Initiatives. Western Climate Initiative, Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions. 
85 B. RICE, The “Triumph” of the Commons, supra note 82, pp. 406-408. 
86 Ibidem. 
87 California Cap-and-Trade, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. 
88 Ibidem. 
89 C.P. CARLARNE, Climate Change Law and Policy, supra note 27.  
90 California Cap-and-Trade, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. 
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system	   foresees	   the	  possibility	  of	   linking	  with	  other	  emissions	   trading	  schemes.	   In	   January	  2014,	   the	   linkage	   between	   the	   Californian	   system	   and	   the	   Quebec	   program	   became	  operational,	  with	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  linking	  with	  all	  the	  other	  WCI	  participants91.	  	  
3.	  Legal	  Issues:	  Federalism	  and	  Sub-­‐Federal	  Initiatives	  
	  The	   compatibility	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   sub-­‐federal	   initiatives	   with	   the	   US	   Constitution	  and	   the	  system	  of	   federalism	  has	  been	  widely	  debated.	  This	   section	  analyses	   issues	  arising	  from	  pre-­‐emption,	  foreign	  affairs,	  the	  Compact	  Clause	  and	  the	  Commerce	  Clause.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  US	  Constitution	  contains,	  in	  Article	  6,	  the	  Supremacy	  Clause,	  establishing	  that	  the	   Constitution	   and	   federal	   laws	   are	   “the	   supreme	   law	   of	   the	   land”.	   This	   provision	   is	   the	  basis	   for	   the	   doctrine	   of	   federal	  preemption,	   according	   to	  which	   in	   some	   cases	   federal	   law	  “pre-­‐empts”	   state	   law92.	  Pre-­‐emption	  operates	   in	   the	   following	   instances:	  when	   federal	   law	  explicitly	  pre-­‐empts	  state	   law	  addressing	   the	  same	  subject;	  when	   federal	   law	  “occupies	   the	  field”	   (field	  pre-­‐emption);	  when	   a	   federal	   law	   and	   a	   state	   law	   are	   in	   conflict,	  which	   occurs	  either	  when	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  comply	  with	  both,	  or	  when	  state	  law	  is	  an	  obstacle	  to	  achieving	   the	   federal	  objectives	   (conflict	  pre-­‐emption)93.	  With	   regard	   to	   climate	  change,	   the	  issue	  will	  certainly	  become	  more	  relevant	  when	  a	  federal	  legislation	  will	  be	  adopted94.	  Second,	   the	   US	   Constitution	   assigns	   exclusive	   competence	   on	   foreign	   affairs	   to	   the	   federal	  government.	  With	  regard	  to	  climate	  change,	  the	  issue	  arose	  as	  to	  whether	  sub-­‐federal	  climate	  initiatives	  could	  interfere	  with	  federal	  foreign	  policy	  on	  climate	  change95.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  made	   it	  clear	   that	  a	  state	   law	  can	  be	  considered	  as	   interfering	  with	   foreign	  affairs,	  and	  therefore	   be	   declared	   unconstitutional,	   even	   if	   no	   action	   was	   taken	   by	   the	   federal	  government96.	  According	  to	  some	  authors,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  involved	  in	  international	   negotiations	   on	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   global	   nature	   of	   the	   problem	  automatically	  make	  any	  state	  action	  unconstitutional97.	  Others,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  believe	  that	  sub-­‐federal	  action	  could	  increase	  the	  US	  credibility	  in	  the	  international	  arena98.	  A	   third	   issue	   concerns	   the	   Compact	   Clause,	   which	   states	   that	   “No	   State	   shall,	   without	   the	  consent	  of	  the	  Congress,	  [...]	  enter	  into	  any	  Agreement	  or	  Compact	  with	  another	  State,	  or	  with	  a	   foreign	  Power”99.	  To	   identify	  whether	  an	  agreement	  between	  States,	   like	  a	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  system,	  amounts	  to	  a	  “compact”,	  the	  case-­‐law	  has	  identified	  5	  “indicia”:	  reciprocity	  or	  mutual	  attribution	  of	  benefits;	  actual	  cooperation	  in	  the	  development	  of	   the	  program;	  creation	  of	  a	  regional	   body;	   the	   fact	   that	   implementation	  by	  one	   State	   is	   conditional	   upon	   action	  by	   the	  
                                                      
91 Ibidem. 
92 A. ARENA, Il principio della preemption nel diritto dell’Unione europea. Esercizio delle competenze e 
ricognizione delle antinomie tra diritto derivato e diritto nazionale, Napoli, 2013, p. 13, and R. HUFFMAN, J. 
WEISGALL, supra note 70, p.9. 
93 K. LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions Trading in the US: Legal Issues, in D. FREESTONE, C. 
STRECK, supra note 6, pp. 406-408. 
94 Ibidem. 
95 Ivi, pp. 408-409, Constitution of the United States, art. 1 and 8. 
96 Ivi and Foreign Affairs Pre-emption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in Harvard Law 
Review, 2006, vol. 119, p. 1894 ss. 
97 Ibidem. 
98 Ibidem. 
99 Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 10. 
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other	  State;	  restrictions	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  State	  to	  modify	  or	  abrogate	  its	  law	  unilaterally	  (thus	  exiting	  the	  agreement)100.	  Even	  if,	  in	  light	  of	  these	  criteria,	  the	  agreement	  is	  considered	  to	   be	   a	   “compact”,	   Congressional	   consent	   is	   not	   automatically	   required.	   US	   judges	   apply	   a	  “functional	   test”:	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   involve	   the	  Congress	   only	   if	   the	   compact	  would	   lead	   to	  «the	  increase	  of	  the	  political	  power	  or	  influence	  of	  the	  States	  affected,	  and	  thus	  encroach	  [...]	  upon	   the	   full	   and	   free	   exercise	   of	   Federal	   authority»101.	  Until	   now,	   however,	   no	   inter-­‐state	  pact	  has	  ever	  been	  declared	  invalid	  under	  the	  Compact	  clause.	  The	  States	  participating	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	   regional	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   regional	   programs	   did	   not	   seek	   Congressional	  consent 102 .	   Opinions	   differ	   on	   whether	   the	   agreements	   at	   issue	   can	   be	   considered	  “compacts”103.	   Even	   if	   they	   were	   considered	   compacts,	   Smith	   believes	   that	   Congressional	  consent	   would	   not	   be	   required,	   as	   the	   program	   deals	   with	   an	   issue	   that	   the	   federal	  government	  has	  expressly	  decided	  not	  to	  address104.	  Finally,	   under	   the	   Commerce	   clause,	   «The	   Congress	   shall	   have	   Power	   to	   [...]	   regulate	  Commerce	   with	   foreign	   Nations,	   and	   among	   the	   several	   States» 105 .	   According	   to	   an	  established	   interpretation,	   this	   clause	   contains	   also	   an	   implicit	   limit	   on	   States’	   authority,	  known	  as	   the	  Dormant	  Commerce	  Clause106,	  which	  prohibits	  States	   from	  taking	  actions	   that	  constitute	   obstacles	   to	   inter-­‐state	   commerce.	   Even	   a	   law	   that	   does	   not	   contain	   a	   direct	  discrimination,	   like	   the	   emissions	   trading	   schemes	   at	   issue,	   can	   be	   considered	  unconstitutional	  under	  the	  Commerce	  Clause107.	   In	   that	  case,	  a	  balancing	  test	   is	  applied:	   the	  law	   will	   be	   considered	   unconstitutional	   if	   the	   obstacle	   it	   creates	   to	   inter-­‐state	   commerce	  outweighs	  the	  state	  benefits	  generated108.	  An	   issue	  that	  could	  generate	  problems	  under	  the	  
Dormant	   Commerce	   Clause	   concerns	   measures	   adopted	   to	   combat	   leakage,	   for	   example	   a	  restriction	  on	  electricity	  imports	  from	  States	  not	  participating	  in	  a	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  program109.	  	  	  
                                                      
100 K. LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions Trading in the US, supra note 93, p. 410, R. 
HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, supra note 70, pp. 10-11. 
101 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), p. 520, K. LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions 
Trading in the US, supra note 93, p. 410 and The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
in Harvard Law Review, vol. 120, 2007, pp. 1960-1962. 
102 K. LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions Trading in the US, supra note 93, p. 410. 
103 Some authors believe it is unlikely that RGGI would be considered a compact: see R. HUFFMAN, J. 
WEISGALL, supra note 70, pp. 10-11, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra 
note 101, pp. 1972-1976, D. A. FARBER, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, in Arizona Law 
Review, vol. 50, 2008,p. 908. Others believe RGGI could be qualified as a compact, see: K. LAMOTTE, D. 
WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions Trading in the US, supra note 93, p. 410. 
104 The authors refers in particular to US Steel Corp v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). M. S. 
SMITH, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy Air: the Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, in 
Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007, vol. 34, pp. 408-411, see K. LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, 
Emissions Trading in the US, supra note 93, pp. 410-411. 
105 Constitution of the United States, art. 1, Section 8. 
106 United Haluers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth, 550 US 330, (2007); see e.g. R. 
HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, supra note 70, pp. 9-10. 
107 K. LAMOTTE, D. WILLIAMSON, L. HOPKINS, Emissions Trading in the US, supra note 93, p. 412. 
108 Ivi. 
109 W. FUNK, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, in UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 2009, vol. 
27, p. 363. 
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3.5.	  Sub-­‐federal	  Cap-­‐and-­‐Trade	  and	  Transnational	  Linkages:	  Constitutional	  Issues	  
	  Given	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  paper,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  discuss	  the	  constitutional	  issues	  analysed	  above	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  linkage	  of	  sub-­‐federal	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  systems	  with	  foreign	  systems.	  To	  this	  end,	  some	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  US	  constitutional	  case-­‐law	  will	  be	  highlighted.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  Supremacy	  Clause,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  federal	  legislation	  that	  expressly	  pre-­‐empts	  linkage	  of	  US	  initiatives	  with	  foreign	  programs,	  no	  issue	  arises	  as	  regards	  express	  pre-­‐emption110.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  field	  pre-­‐emption111.	  With	  regard	  to	  conflict	  pre-­‐emption,	  the	  relevant	  doctrine	  is	   the	   implied	   foreign	   affairs	   pre-­‐emption,	   discussed	   in	   two	   Supreme	   Court	   cases.	   The	   Crobsy	   v.	  
National	  Foreign	  Trade	  Council112	  	   case	   concerned	  a	  Massachusetts	   law	  prohibiting	   state	  entities	  from	  purchasing	  goods	  and	  services	  from	  companies	  that	  had	  trade	  relations	  with	  Burma113.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	   declared	   the	   law	  unconstitutional	   stating	   that,	  when	   a	   federal	   policy	   on	   foreign	  affairs	  has	  been	  adopted,	  States	  cannot	  adopt	  measures	  that	  reduce	  the	  US	  negotiating	  power	  (the	  “bargaining	   chips”)	   of	   the	   President	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   diminishing	   its	   economic	   and	  diplomatic	  influence114:	  «We	  need	  not	  get	  into	  any	  general	  consideration	  of	   limits	  of	  state	  action	  affecting	   foreign	  affairs	   to	  realize	   that	   the	  President’s	  maximum	  power	   to	  persuade	  rests	  on	  his	  capacity	  to	  bargain	  for	  the	  benefits	  of	  access	  to	  the	  entire	  national	  economy	  without	  exception	  for	  enclaves	  fenced	  off	  willy-­‐nilly	  by	  inconsistent	  political	  tactics»115.	  In	  American	  Insurance	  Association	  v.	  Garamendi116,	  what	  established	  in	  Crosby	  was	  extended	  to	   a	   subject	   which	   was	   not	   regulated	   by	   a	   federal	   law,	   but	   only	   by	   President’s	   executive	  agreements117.	  In	  Garamendi	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  on	  a	  Californian	  law	  requiring	  insurers	  to	  disclose	  information	  about	  all	  policies	  sold	  in	  Europe	  between	  1920	  and	  1945,	  to	  ensure	  payment	  of	  policies	  belonging	  to	  Holocaust	  victims118.	  This	  law	  was	  declared	  invalid	  because	  of	   the	  executive	  agreements	   signed	  with	  Austria,	  France	  and	  Germany,	  which	   imposed	   less	  burdensome	  conditions	  on	  insurers119.	  As	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  declaration	  of	  invalidity	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  a	  Californian	  law	  and	  Presidential	  policy,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  that	  Garamendi	  is	  an	  example	  of	  conflict	  pre-­‐emption,	  although	  its	  classification	  is	  debated120.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  based	  on	  Garamendi,	  a	  law	  can	  be	  pre-­‐empted	  because	  of	  a	  mere	  executive	  conduct,	  and	  absent	  a	  federal	  law	  or	  a	  formal	  executive	  order121.	  
                                                      
110  H. CHANG, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California’s Link With the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme, in Environmental Law Reporter, 2007, vol. 37, p. 10774. 
111 S. WELTON, Stata Dynamysm, Federal Constraints: Possibl Constitutional Hurdles to Cross-Border Cap-
and-Trade, in Natural Resources and Environment, 2012, vol. 27, pp. 37-38. 
112 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
113 R. HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, supra note 70, p. 12. 
114 H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10775, S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 38, Crosby, p. 377, R. HUFFMAN, J. 
WEISGALL, supra note 70, p. 12. 
115 Crosby, p. 381.  
116 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
117 R. HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, Climate Change and the States, supra note 70, p. 12. 
118 Ivi, p. 13. 
119 Foreign Affairs Pre-emption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 96, p. 1879, H. 
CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10775. 
120 See Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 96, p. 1880, 
S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 38, H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10775. 
121 H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 38. 
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To	   argue	   for	   the	   invalidity	   of	   a	   transnational	   linkage	   under	   the	   conflict	   pre-­‐emption,	   one	  could	   point	   to	   the	   position	   expressed	   by	   the	   Congress	   (in	   particular	   in	   the	   Byrd-­‐Hagel	  resolution)	   and	   to	   the	   executive	   attitude	   during	   international	   negotiations122.	   However,	   in	  two	   rulings	   it	   was	   stated	   that	   even	   under	   the	   Bush	   Administration	   the	   government	  considered	  state	  initiatives	  as	  an	  important	  part	  of	  US	  policy	  on	  climate	  change123.	  Moreover,	  when	  the	  international	  community	  criticized	  the	  US	  inertia	  on	  the	  issue,	  the	  government	  used	  the	   sub-­‐federal	   initiatives	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   US	   involvement	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   climate	  change124.	  President	  Obama	  openly	  praised	  the	  RGGI	  initiative125.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  involved	  in	  international	  negotiations	  on	  the	  climate	  regime,	   the	   judges	   could	   consider	   an	   international	   linkage	   unconstitutional	   under	   the	  “bargaining	   chip”	   doctrine.	   The	   conclusion	   is	   that	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   controversy	   on	   these	  issues	   would	   be	   uncertain.	   The	   current	   Administration	   tends	   to	   promote	   sub-­‐federal	  initiatives,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  conflict.	  However,	  things	  might	  change	  with	  a	  different	  Administration126.	  Second,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  dormant	  foreign	  affairs	  pre-­‐emption	  doctrine,	  on	  which	  the	  decision	  Zschernig	  v.	  Miller127	  is	  based.	  In	  this	  ruling,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  struck	  down	  an	  Oregon	   law	  which	  prohibited	   inheritance	  by	   a	  non-­‐resident	   alien	  unless	   certain	   conditions	  were	  met	  by	  the	  alien’s	  country128.	  The	  statute	  was	  declared	  unconstitutional	  because	  of	  its	  “direct	   effect”	   on	   foreign	   affairs:	   «The	   present	   Oregon	   law	   [...]	   has	   a	   direct	   impact	   upon	  foreign	   relations»129.	   The	   Court	   stated	   here	   that	   a	   state	   law	   can	   be	   pre-­‐empted	   under	   the	  dormant	  foreign	  affairs	  pre-­‐emption	  even	  absent	  any	  federal	  policy	  on	  the	  matter	  and	  absent	  a	   conflict	   between	   the	   state	   measure	   and	   a	   federal	   policy130.	   The	   scope	   of	   this	   doctrine	  remains	  uncertain,	  and	  many	  diverging	  interpretations	  have	  been	  put	  forward.	  In	  Garamendi	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  Zschernig;	  however	  in	  Garamendi	  Justice	  Ginsburg,	  in	  her	  dissenting	  opinion,	  gave	  this	  reading	  of	  Zschernig:	  «The	  notion	  of	  “dormant	  foreign	  affairs	  pre-­‐emption”	  with	  which	  Zschernig	   is	   associated	   resonates	  most	   audibly	  when	   a	   state	   action	   reflect[s]	   a	  state	  policy	  critical	  of	   foreign	  governments	  and	  involve[s]	   ‘sitting	  in	   judgment’	  on	  them»131.	  Some	  lower	  courts	  adopted	  the	  “sit	  in	  judgment”	  test,	  whereas	  other	  Courts	  believe	  that	  the	  main	  point	  of	   the	   judgment	   is	  the	  Court’s	  statement	  that	  the	   law	  «has	  a	  direct	   impact	  upon	  foreign	  relations	  and	  may	  well	  adversely	  affect	  the	  power	  of	  the	  central	  government	  to	  deal	  with	  those	  problems»132.	  Given	  this	  uncertain	  picture,	  a	  Court	  called	  to	  consider	  the	  validity	  of	  a	   transnational	   linkage	  under	  the	  dormant	  foreign	  affairs	  pre-­‐emption	  would	  have	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  freedom	  in	  interpreting	  the	  doctrine133.	  
                                                      
122 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 38. 
123 Ibidem. 
124 H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10776. 
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127 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
128 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 38. 
129 Zschernig, p. 441. 
130 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 38, H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10778. 
131 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39. 
132 H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10778, S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39. 
133 R. HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, supra note 70, p. 11. 
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Furthermore,	   the	   Compact	   Clause	   implications	   should	   be	   discussed.	   Huffman	   and	  Weisgall	  believe	   that	   a	   transnational	   linkage,	   in	   order	   to	   function	   properly,	   would	   need	   to	   have	  characteristics	  of	  enforceability	  and	  stability	  such	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  not	  to	  label	  such	  an	   arrangement	   a	   “compact” 134 .	   Welton	   suggests	   that	   the	   Compact	   Clause	   could	   be	  interpreted	  more	   strictly	  when	   agreements	  with	   foreign	   countries	   are	   at	   issue,	   because	   of	  their	   potential	   impact	   on	   foreign	   affairs135.	   The	   case-­‐law	   seems	   to	   imply	   that	   «certain	  additional	  protections	  apply	   to	   foreign	  compacts»136,	  although	  no	   foreign	  compact	  has	  ever	  been	  declared	  unconstitutional	  under	  this	  doctrine.	  	  A	  further	  aspect	  to	  consider	  is	  the	  dormant	  foreign	  Commerce	  Clause,	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  dormant	  
Commerce	   Clause137	  which	   limits	   interference	   with	   international	   commerce.	   In	   Japan	   Line,	  
Ltd.	   v.	   County	   of	   Los	  Angeles138,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   applied	   the	   dormant	   foreign	   Commerce	  
Clause	   to	   strike	   down	   a	   law	   that	   imposed	   a	   tax	   on	   the	   shipping	   containers	   of	   a	   Japanese	  company	   whose	   own	   government	   imposed	   similar	   taxes.	   The	   rationale	   was	   that	   this	  generated	  a	  double	   imposition	  and	  prevented	   the	  US	  government	   from	  speaking	  with	   “one	  voice”	   on	   international	   trade139.	   Transnational	   emission	   trading	   linkages	   could	   raise	   issues	  under	   the	   “one	   voice”	   test.	   In	   the	   case	   Barclays	   Bank	   PLC	   v.	   Franchise	   Tax	   Board140,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  «indicated	  that	  it	  will	  not	  necessarily	  invalidate	  state	  policies	  that	  have	  even	  tacit	   congressional	   approval»141,	   although	   the	   meaning	   of	   this	   decision	   for	   the	   dormant	  
foreign	  Commerce	  Clause	  doctrine	  is	  uncertain142.	  In	  any	  case,	  there	  have	  not	  been	  such	  forms	  of	  approval	  by	  the	  Congress	  towards	  sub-­‐national	  emissions	  trading143.	  In	  conclusion,	  it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  case-­‐law	  on	  these	  issues	  is	  not	  clear,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  possible	  to	  foresee	  the	  outcome	  of	  possible	  future	  cases.	  According	  to	  Welton,	  the	   dormant	   foreign	   affairs	   pre-­‐emption,	   the	   dormant	   foreign	   Commerce	   Clause	   and	   the	  
Compact	  Clause	   are	  about	   similar	   issues:	   in	  all	   three,	   the	  question	   is,	   in	  essence,	  whether	  a	  sub-­‐federal	   transnational	   system	   would	   hinder	   the	   federal	   government’s	   ability	   to	   act	  internationally	   on	   climate	   change144.	   It	   should	   be	   stressed,	   however,	   that	   the	   situation	   at	  stake	   is	   very	   different	   from	   the	   cases	   where	   generally	   the	   doctrines	   discussed	   above	   are	  applied,	   that	   is,	   cases	  where	   the	   States	   try	   «to	   exact	   something	   from	   a	   foreign	   state,	   or	   to	  condemn	   a	   foreign	   state’s	   actions,	   or	   to	   enlarge	   state	   power»145.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	  hypotheses	  at	  stake	  would	  be	  examples	  of	  cooperation	  which	  could	  actually	  strengthen	  the	  US	  position	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  increasing	  the	  credibility	  of	  US	  commitments146.	  
                                                      
134 R. HUFFMAN, J. WEISGALL, Climate Change and the States, supra note 70, p. 11. 
135 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39. 
136 E. SWAINE, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, in Columbia Law Review, 2003, vol.103, pp. 506-509. 
137 H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10779. 
138 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
139 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39,  H. CHANG, supra note 110, p. 10779. 
140 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
141 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39. 
142 H. CHANG, supra note 110, 10779-10780. 
143 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39. 
144 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 39. 
145 S. WELTON, supra note 111, p. 40. 
146 Ivi and R.B. STEWART, p. 705. 
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SECTION	  4	  
EMISSIONS	  TRADING:	  THE	  EU,	  THE	  US	  AND	  THE	  GLOBAL	  REGIME	  
	  
1.	   Assessing	   the	   Legal	   Literature	   on	   Emissions	   Trading:	   the	   Need	   for	   a	   Contextual	  
Approach	  
	  Bogojević	  has	  remapped	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  emissions	  trading,	  challenging	  the	  common	  idea	   that	   emissions	   trading	   is	   a	   simple	   and	   straightforward	   system	   that	   can	   easily	   be	  replicated	   in	  different	   jurisdictions,	  and	  in	  which	   law	  and	  legal	   issues	  have	  a	  marginal	  role.	  By	  dissecting	  emissions	  trading	  discourses	  in	  legal	  literature,	  the	  author	  has	  highlighted	  the	  different	   ways	   in	   which	   this	  mechanism	   has	   been	   conceptualized,	   showing	   that	   emissions	  trading,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  simple	  and	  uniform	  instrument,	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  diverse	  and	  complex	  governance	   structures,	   embedded	   with	   legal	   complexities.	   At	   the	   core	   of	   the	   emissions	  trading	   discourse	   lie	   questions	   concerning	   the	   allocation	   of	   regulatory	   power	   and	   the	  interplay	  between	  the	  State	  and	  the	  market.	  	  The	  widely	  debated	  question	  of	  the	  legal	  nature	  of	  allowances,	  for	  example,	  has	  recently	  been	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  public-­‐private	  relationships	  in	   the	   allocation	   of	   public	   scarce	   resources	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   private	   rights	   by	   the	  public	  power147.	  It	  follows	  that	  an	  emissions	  trading	  system	  can	  only	  be	  analysed	  and	  understood	  against	  the	  background	   of	   the	   legal	   context	   in	   which	   it	   operates:	   the	   prevailing	   emissions	   trading	  literature,	   which	   is	   technical,	   economics-­‐centred	   and	   globally-­‐oriented,	   proves	  methodologically	   inadequate.148.	   Paraphrasing	  Natalino	   Irti,	   the	   (emissions)	  market	   cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   locus	  naturalis,	  separate	  and	   independent	   from	  the	   law,	  but	   rather	  as	  a	  
locus	  artificialis,	  determined	  and	  shaped	  by	  the	  normative	  structure	  that	  creates	  it149.	  	  This	   new	   understanding	   of	   emissions	   trading	   sits	   well	   within	   the	   broader	   debate	   on	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   public	   and	   private	   spheres	   and	   the	   need	   to	  rethink	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  market150.	  	  	  
2.	  Climate	  Change	  and	  Legal	  Context:	  a	  Comparison	  Between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  	  Some	  aspects	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  US	  emissions	  trading	  systems	  and	  their	  respective	  legal	  contexts	  have	  been	  highlighted	  in	  Parts	  II	  and	  III.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  possibilities	   of	   EU	   and	   US	   coordination	   in	   the	   global	   scenario,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   examine	   the	  different	  approaches	  of	  these	  two	  legal	  orders	  towards	  climate	  change	  policies	  and	  towards	  two	  fundamental	  international	  environmental	  law	  principles:	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities151.	  	  
                                                      
147 M. COLANGELO, Creating Property Rights. Law and Regulation of Secondary Trading in the European 
Union, 2012. 
148 This analysis summarizes the findings of S. BOGOJEVIĆ, Emissions Trading Schemes, supra note 18, 2013. 
149 See N. IRTI, L’ordine giuridico del mercato, Bari, 2008. 
150  See, e.g., D. GALLO, I servizi di interesse economico generale. Stato, mercato e welfare nel diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2010, and specifically on climate change see L. GODDEN, F. ROCHFORD, J. PEEL, L. 
CARIPIS, R. CARTER, Law, Governance and Risk: Deconstructing the Public-Private Divide in Climate Change 
Adaptation, in University of New South Wales Law Journal, 2013. 
151 For the following analysis, see C.P.CARLARNE, Climate Change Law and Policy, supra note 27. 
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First	   of	   all,	   notable	   differences	   can	   be	   found	   in	   terms	   of	   “legal	   framework”.	   The	   European	  Union	  is	  bound	  by	  emissions	  reduction	  obligations	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  and	  the	  Member	  States	   have	   emissions	   reductions	   obligations	   under	   international	   law,	   EU	   law	   and	  national	  law.	   In	   the	   US,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   there	   is	   no	   binding	   legal	   framework,	   either	   at	   the	  international	   or	   federal	   level.	   In	   the	   US,	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   legal	   framework	   has	  given	   rise	   to	   a	   mosaic	   of	   sub-­‐federal	   initiatives,	   judicial	   decisions	   and	   administrative	  measures.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  complex,	  fragmented	  and	  uncertain	  scenario.	  	  A	   further	   difference	   concerns	   the	   “source	   of	   political	   leadership”.	   European	   policies	   on	  climate	  change	  are	  dominated	  by	  the	  EU,	  which	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  speak	  with	  a	  unified	  voice	  in	  international	   negotiations.	   Moreover,	   the	   EU	   provides	   mechanisms	   «facilitating	  communication,	   cooperation	   and	   consensus	   building»	   between	   Member	   States152.	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	  the	  US	  the	  political	   leadership	  belongs	  to	  the	  initiatives	  taken	  by	  sub-­‐federal	  entities	   to	   fill	   the	   void	   at	   the	   federal	   level.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   US	   cannot	   speak	  with	   a	  unified	   voice	   in	   the	   international	   arena	   and	   does	   not	   provide	   States	   with	   coordination	  instruments.	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  US,	   furthermore,	  have	  very	  different	  approaches	  towards	  international	   law.	  The	  US	  tends	  to	  be	  much	  more	  inward-­‐looking	  and,	  with	  regard	  to	  climate	  change,	  not	  only	  has	  it	  objected	  binding	  obligations,	  but	  it	  has	  also	  questioned	  the	  very	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  international	  regime	  is	  based.	  The	  European	  Union,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  has	  been	  constantly	  and	   actively	   involved	   in	   the	   international	   climate	   regime	   and	   has	   embraced	   its	   founding	  principles.	  It	  should	  be	  stressed,	  however,	  that	  also	  elements	  of	  convergence	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  EU	  and	  US	  climate	  change	  policies.	  In	  both	  cases,	  for	  example,	  one	  can	  identify	  “systemic	  pushes	  and	  pulls”.	   The	   EU,	   however,	  manages	   to	   overcome	   internal	   divisions	   and	   reach	   consensus	   on	  climate	  change	  issues153.	  	  
3.	  General	  Principles	  of	  International	  Environmental	  Law:	  EU	  and	  US	  approaches	  
	  The	   precautionary	   principle	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   common	   but	   differentiated	   responsibility	  are	  foundational	  principles	  that	  underpin	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  regime.	  Examining	  the	  EU	  and	  US	  approaches	   towards	   these	  principles	   is	   thus	   fundamental	   to	  understand	   the	  future	  prospects	  of	  EU	  and	  US	  cooperation	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  climate	  change.	  The	   precautionary	   principle	   is	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Rio	   Declaration:	   «In	   order	   to	   protect	   the	  environment,	  the	  precautionary	  approach	  shall	  be	  widely	  applied	  by	  States	  according	  to	  their	  capabilities.	  Where	  there	  are	  threats	  of	  serious	  or	  irreversible	  damage,	   lack	  of	  full	  scientific	  certainty	   shall	   not	   be	   used	   as	   a	   reason	   for	   postponing	   cost-­‐effective	  measures	   to	   prevent	  environmental	   degradation»154.	   While	   the	   EU	   has	   always	   been	   a	   strong	   promoter	   of	   this	  principle,	   the	  US	  has	  opposed	   this	   approach	  and	  supported	   the	   “sound	  science”	   test.	   It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	   this	  position	   is	  due	  to	   the	  US	  “adversarial	   legalism”,	   that	   is,	  a	  system	  that	  implies,	   compared	   to	   the	   EU,	   more	   frequent	   recourse	   to	   judicial	   review,	   more	   frequent	  judicial	   revision	   and	   delay	   of	   administrative	   decisions,	   and	   «more	   punitive	   legal	   sanctions	  
                                                      
152 Ivi, p. 257. 
153 Ivi, p. 264. 
154 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14 1992), A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I). 
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(including	  larger	  civil	  damage	  awards)»155.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  has	  been	  underlined	  that	  the	  US	  fears	  that	  the	  principle	  would	  be	  enforced	  more	  vigorously	  in	  the	  US	  than	  in	  the	  EU,	  with	  a	  resulting	  de	  facto	  disparity	  of	  commitments156.	  	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibility,	  it	  was	  first	  formally	  used	  in	  the	  Rio	  Declaration157,	  and	  was	  included	  in	  art.	  3	  of	  the	  UNFCCC:	  «The	  Parties	  should	  protect	  the	  climate	  system	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  present	  and	  future	  generations	  of	  humankind,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equity	  and	   in	  accordance	  with	   their	  common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities	  and	  respective	  capabilities.	  Accordingly,	  the	  developed	  country	  Parties	  should	  take	  the	  lead	  in	   combating	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   adverse	   effects	   thereof».	   In	   sum,	   in	   efforts	   to	   combat	  climate	   change,	   States’	   responsibilities	   must	   be	   differentiated	   according	   to	   their	   prior	  contribution	   to	  causing	   the	  phenomenon	  and	  their	  current	  ability	   to	   take	  measures	  against	  it158.	  The	  US,	  despite	  having	  never	  openly	  rejected	  the	  principle,	  has	  consistently	  objected	  to	  any	  interpretation	  of	  the	  principle	  that	  exempts	  developing	  countries	  from	  binding	  obligations159.	  The	   G77/China,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   «explicitly	   rejects	   the	   notion	   that	   developing	   countries	  should	  undertake	  any	  legally	  binding	  commitment»160.	  The	  EU	  position	  was	  originally	  closer	  to	   this	   second	   interpretation.	  Around	  2009,	   however,	   the	  EU	  has	   started	   to	   emphasize	   the	  importance	  of	  a	  meaningful	  participation	  of	  emerging	  economies	  in	  efforts	  to	  combat	  climate	  change161.	  	  
4.	  Legal	  Nature	  of	  Allowances	  
	  The	   legal	   nature	   of	   emissions	   rights	   in	  market-­‐based	   systems	   has	   been	   intensely	   debated.	  From	  an	  ethical	  perspective,	  some	  have	  interpreted	  emissions	  allowances	  as	  a	  «privatization	  of	   the	   atmosphere»,	   a	   «license	   to	   pollute»	   and	   an	   abuse	   of	   the	   commons162.	   It	   has	   been	  argued,	  however,	  that	  actually	  all	  «the	  State’s	  environmental	  protection	  efforts	  are	  inevitably	  property-­‐based	  in	  that	  all	  solutions	  to	  the	  ‘tragedy	  of	  the	  commons’	  involve	  the	  imposition	  of	  property	   rights	   (private/individual,	   common	   or	   state/public)	   on	   formerly	   un-­‐owned	   (non-­‐
                                                      
155 C.P.CARLARNE, Climate Change Law and Policy, supra note 27, pp. 321-323. 
156 J. B. WIENER, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory 
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D. FREESTONE, C. STRECK, supra note 6, 2009, pp. 37-38, G. TORRES, Who Owns the Sky? Seventh Annual 
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property	  or	  open-­‐access)	  resources»163.	  No	  “privatization	  of	  the	  atmosphere”	  is	  involved,	  as	  «[t]he	   State	  does	  not	   transfer	  ownership	   in	   a	  parcel	   of	   air,	   but	   instead	   creates	   the	   right	   to	  release	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  GHGs	  into	  the	  atmosphere»164.	  In	  the	  EU	  ETS	  Directive,	  an	  allowance	  (or	  EUA)	  is	  defined	  as	  «an	  allowance	  to	  emit	  one	  tonne	  of	   carbon	   dioxide	   equivalent	   during	   a	   specified	   period,	   which	   shall	   be	   valid	   only	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   meeting	   the	   requirements	   of	   this	   Directive	   and	   shall	   be	   transferable	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Directive»165.	  The	  Directive	  does	  not	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  legal	  nature	  of	  allowances,	  as	  including	  such	  definition	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  was	  considered	  incompatible	  with	   the	   subsidiarity	   principle166.	   It	   is	   therefore	   up	   to	   the	  Member	   States	   to	  qualify	   the	   nature	   of	   emissions	   rights.	   Member	   States	   are	   hesitant	   to	   provide	   an	   explicit	  definition	  of	   the	   legal	  nature	  of	  EUAs,	  whose	  sui	  generis	  nature	  «does	  not	  seem	  to	  easily	   fit	  into	  existing	  national	  legal	  terms»167.	  Legal	  treatment	  differs	  from	  Member	  State	  to	  Member	  State:	   EUAs	   have	   been	   qualified	   sometimes	   as	   intangible	   goods,	   sometimes	   as	   financial	  instruments;	   definitions	   differ	   for	   accounting	   purposes;	   there	   has	   been	   uncertainty	   with	  regard	  to	  taxation168.	  These	  inconsistencies	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  causing	  uncertainty	  and	  possible	  distortions	  of	  competition169.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  US,	  the	  definition	  provided	  in	  the	  Acid	  Rain	  Program	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  an	  allowance	   is	   a	   «limited	   authorization»	   and	   that	   it	   does	   not	   constitute	   «a	   property	  right»170.This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  of	  the	  US	  Constitution,	  which	  states	  that	  private	  property	  cannot	  be	  taken	  for	  public	  use	  without	  just	  compensation171:	  «If	  the	  credits	  constituted	   private	   property,	   the	   government	   would	   have	   to	   offer	   fair	   compensation	   for	  regulations	   that	  had	   the	  effect	  of	   taking	   the	  value	  of	   this	  property	   »172,	   such	  as	  decision	   to	  make	   the	   cap	   more	   stringent.	   However,	   the	   law	   itself	   provides	   that	   allowances	   «may	   be	  received,	   held,	   and	   temporarily	   or	   permanently	   transferred»173 ,	   and	   the	   case-­‐law	   has	  gradually	  attributed	  to	  the	  allowances	  many	  features	  of	  property.	  Gehring	  and	  Streck	  believe	  that	  such	  rights	  can	  be	  considered	  de	  facto	  property	  rights	  between	  private	  parties,	  but	  not	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towards	  the	  State174.	  These	  considerations	  can	  be	  deemed	  valid	  also	  for	  US	  carbon	  emissions	  trading	  programs,	  as	  they	  include	  similar	  definitions175.	  	  Many	  authors	  consider	  emissions	  rights	  as	  a	  hybrid	  between	  an	  administrative	  permit	  and	  a	  property	   right,	   and	   define	   them	   «regulatory	   rights»176.	   In	   examining	   the	   legal	   nature	   of	  emissions	  entitlements,	  Manea	  has	  put	  forward	  the	  new	  category	  of	  “instrumental	  property”:	  «the	  notion	  of	   instrumental	  property	   is	  defined	  by	   the	  public	  policy	  goals	  of	   the	  regulatory	  regime	  and	  also	  by	  the	  particular	  context	  in	  which	  the	  rights	  operate.	  Instrumental	  property	  must	   necessarily	   be	   balanced	   against	   extraneous	   public	   or	   private	   interests	  which	   the	   law	  regards	  as	  deserving	  protection».177	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CONCLUSION	  
	  Not	   only	   has	   the	   European	   Union	   supported	   the	   international	   climate	   framework:	   the	  UNFCCC	  and	  its	  principles	  are	  at	  the	  very	  core	  of	  European	  climate	  policies178.	  The	  multi-­‐level	  structure	  of	  the	  EU	  itself,	  it	  has	  been	  noted,	  determines	  a	  multi-­‐level	  involvement:	  «It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	   that	   the	  EU,	   its	  member	   states,	   and	  arguably	  even	   its	  public,	  have	  actually	   internalized	  these	  goals,	  values,	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  global	  climate	  regime	  to	  a	  significant	  degree.	  These	  norms	  have	  become	  woven	   into	   the	   legal	   and	  policy	  discourse	  within	  Europe	   and	  perhaps	  even	   into	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   member	   of	   the	   global	   climate	   community»179.	   The	  approach	  of	  the	  United	  States	  towards	  the	  UNFCCC	  regime	  has	  been	  very	  different:	  not	  only	  has	   the	   US	   not	   taken	   part	   in	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   but	   it	   has	   been	   openly	   hostile	   to	   the	  principles	  underpinning	  the	  Convention,	  has	  tried	  to	  limit	  their	  influence	  and	  has	  constantly	  denied	   them	   the	   status	   of	   international	   customary	   law180.	   However,	   many	   factors	   push	  towards	  a	  more	  significant	  involvement	  of	  the	  US	  (such	  as	  the	  pressure	  coming	  from	  both	  the	  international	  community	  and	  sub-­‐federal	  initiatives)181,	  and	  the	  Obama	  Administration,	  with	  the	  Clean	  Power	  Plan	  and	   its	  proposal	   to	  cut	  carbon	  emissions	   from	  existing	  power	  plants,	  has	  taken	  a	  major	  step	  and	  has	  challenged	  the	  Congress	  historic	  inaction	  on	  climate	  change.	  Despite	  their	  different	  approaches	  and	  their	  different	  positions	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  have	  certainly	  a	  feature	  in	  common	  on	  climate	  change	  issues:	  the	  centrality	  of	  economic	   considerations.	   The	   difference	   lies	   in	   the	   way	   economic	   considerations	   and	   the	  fight	   against	   climate	   change	   have	   been	   linked.	   The	   Bush	  Administration	   saw	   taking	   action	  against	  climate	  change	  only	  as	  a	  cost,	  and	  any	  international	  commitment	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  as	  a	   threat	   to	   the	  US	  economy.	   In	   the	  European	  Union,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   fight	  against	  climate	   change	   has	   been	   depicted	   as	   an	   economic	   opportunity	   and	   a	  way	   to	   avoid	   greater	  costs	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  ETS	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  EU	  climate	  policies	  proves	  how	  much	  economic	  considerations	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  developing	  climate	  strategies.	  The	   Obama	   administration	   approach	   is	   closer	   to	   the	   European	   position.	   Carlarne	   notes:	  «h]eavy	   reliance	   on	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	   and	   growing	   concerns	   about	   the	   economic	  implications	   of	   stringent	   emissions	   limits	   are	   bringing	   US	   and	   EU	   climate	   policies	   closer	  together.	  Convergence	  around	  the	  question	  of	  economic	  well-­‐being	  is	  to	  be	  expected»182.	  	  Cooperation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US	  on	  climate	  change	  is	  key	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  fight	  against	   climate	   change.	   The	   analysis	   of	   this	   paper	   has	   highlighted	   only	   some	   of	   the	   legal	  issues	   arising	   in	   the	   systems	   examined:	   further	   research	   is	   required	   to	   develop	   a	   deep	  understanding	  of	   the	  EU	  and	  US	  emissions	  trading	  schemes,	   their	  regulatory	  structure,	  and	  the	   roles	   played	   by	   the	   government	   and	   the	   market	   in	   each	   administrative	   framework.	  Moreover,	  the	  future	  climate	  agreement	  could	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  possibilities	  of	  EU	  and	  US	  cooperation	  by	  regulating	  linkages	  between	  different	  mechanisms.	  Ultimately,	  the	  present	  paper	   aims	   at	   taking	   the	   first	   steps	   towards	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   regulatory	  structures	  of	  emissions	  trading	  systems	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  international	  law:	  only	  the	  right	  synergies	  can	  make	  the	  fight	  against	  climate	  change	  successful.	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